























ask	 a	 very	different	 question	 that	 few	 if	 any	 seem	 concerned	with:	 can	 capitalists	 afford	
recovery	in	the	first	place?	The	article	contextualizes	and	examines	this	question	from	the	
viewpoint	of	economic	policy.	The	analysis	is	divided	into	three	parts.	The	first	part	deals	





power	 hinges	 not	 on	 growth,	 but	 on	 strategic	 sabotage.	 So	 from	 this	 viewpoint,	 the	 key	
















conomic,	 financial	 and	 social	 commentators	 from	 all	 directions	 and	 of	 various	
persuasions	are	obsessed	with	the	prospect	of	recovery.	The	world	remains	mired	in	a	









power,	 so	 for	 us,	 the	 crisis	 of	 accumulation	 is	 a	 crisis	 of	 capitalized	 power.	 Furthermore,	
whereas	 the	 economic	 viewpoint,	 particularly	 the	 Marxist,	 sees	 the	 current	 crisis	 as	 the	
symptom	 and	 culmination	 of	 a	 long	 process	 of	 weakening	 accumulation,	 for	 us	 it	 is	 the	




asymptotes,	 or	 limits	 (Bichler	 and	 Nitzan	 2012a).	 The	 closer	 capitalized	 power	 is	 to	 its	
asymptotes,	the	more	difficult	it	is	to	augment	it	further.	Capitalists,	though,	have	no	choice.	
They	are	conditioned	and	compelled	to	increase	their	capitalized	power	without	end,	and	that	












policy.	 Thematically,	 the	 analysis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 deals	with	 the	
mainstream	macroeconomic	perspective.	This	approach	claims	to	have	already	solved	the	key	
theoretical	riddles,	so	the	main	emphasis	here	is	on	the	practical	question	of	how	to	engineer	
a	 recovery.	 The	 answer	 to	 this	 question,	 though,	 remains	 elusive.	 The	 recent	 crisis	 has	
undermined	the	self‐confidence	of	policymakers:	they	are	no	longer	certain	of	their	theoretical	
models,	they	mistrust	their	policy‐tools,	and	they	feel	increasingly	short	on	policy	ammunition.	







accumulation,	 so	 the	 question	 for	 them	 is	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 sustained	 growth.	 This	
approach	 offers	 very	 important	 insights,	 but	 its	 application	 to	 contemporary	 capitalism	 is	
hampered	by	conceptual	quandaries	and	empirical	inconsistencies.	Mainstream	and	Marxist	
economics	obviously	are	very	different	from	each	other	in	framework	and	goals.	Nonetheless,	






















Fed	Chairperson	Alan	Greenspan	spoke	of	himself	and	his	 like	being	 in	a	state	of	 ‘shocked	
disbelief’	after	their	‘whole	intellectual	edifice’	had	collapsed,	while	journalist	Gillian	Tett	of	
the	 Financial	 Times	 described	 a	 sense	 of	 total	 confusion,	 as	 capitalists,	 policymakers	 and	
smaller	 investors	 realized	 that	 their	 ‘intellectual	 compass’	 had	 been	 broken.	 The	 next	 five	
years	have	done	little	to	ease	this	systemic	fear.	In	2013,	central	bankers	admitted	quite	openly	
that	 they	 have	 no	 clue	 as	 to	 what	 is	 going	 on	 –	 or,	 in	 their	 own	words,	 that	 they	 are	 in	
‘uncharted	territory’	which	they	do	not	‘fully	understand’,	and	that	they	are	‘flying	blind	when	
steering	their	economies’.	In	that	same	year,	Lawrence	Summers,	a	former	Treasury	Secretary	




























reinforcing	 confused	 market	 behaviour.	 It	 doesn’t	 help	 that	 our	 economic	 theories	 were	
constructed	for	a	different	world.	Most	models	depict	economies	close	to	equilibrium.	.	.	.	And	












[Some]	 of	 the	 leading	 figures	 in	 central	 banking	 conceded	 they	were	 flying	blind	when	


























bubbles	and	loose	credit	were	only	sufficient	to	drive	moderate	growth.	 .	 .	 .	Is	it	possible	
that	the	US	and	other	major	global	economies	might	not	return	to	full	employment	and	






Lethargic	 growth,	 widespread	 job	 dissatisfaction	 and	 staggering	 debt	 –	 such	 is	 life	 in	 a	
western	world	that	seems	to	have	lost	the	habit	of	innovation	that	energised	it	for	more	than	
a	century.	.	.	.	It	is	urgent	that	these	nations	find	a	way	back	to	their	past	dynamism.	.	.	.	The	
blame	 for	 the	 losses	of	 innovation	behind	 slowdowns	 in	productivity	 lies	with	 the	
spread	of	corporatist	values,	particularly	solidarity,	security	and	stability.	Politicians	
have	 introduced	 regulation	 that	 stifles	 competition;	 patronised	 interest	 groups	 through	
pork‐barrel	contracts;	and	 lent	direction	to	the	economy	through	 industrial	policy.	 In	 the	





What	underpins	this	systemic	 fear?	Why	does	the	ruling	class	 feel	 ‘bereft	of	an	 intellectual	
compass’?	Why	do	policymakers	admit	that	they	are	‘flying	blind’?	Why	do	the	ideologues	of	





































































To	understand	 the	gravity	of	 the	 situation	 for	policymakers,	 and	 for	 the	 ruling	 class	more	
broadly,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 provide	 some	 theoretical	 background.	 Consider	 the	 simple	
decomposition	offered	in	Equation	1:	
	






















Until	 the	 1930s,	 the	 conventional	 liberal	 dogma	 was	 that	 government	 intervention	 was	
unnecessary	 and	 harmful:	 it	 was	 unnecessary	 because	 the	 market	 mechanism	 was	 self‐
correcting,	which,	in	today’s	lingo,	means	that	real	GDP	tends	to	oscillate	near	its	optimal,	full‐
employment	value	to	begin	with;	and	it	was	harmful	because	it	led	to	distortions,	misallocation	
and	undue	 inflation	or	deflation.	Now,	although	the	pre‐1930s	economists	did	not	 think	 in	
























mismatch	of	 investment	and	savings.	As	society	grows	richer,	he	argued,	 the	propensity	 to	
invest	declines	while	the	propensity	to	save	rises.	And	since	saving	and	investment	decisions	
are	made	by	different	agents,	the	result	of	this	mismatch	is	‘deficient	demand’	and	a	tendency	
















period	 until	 1946,	 and	 for	 this	 period	 we	 have	 computed	 the	 series	 mean	 and	 standard	











































































This	 record,	which	 is	probably	 representative	of	what	happened	 in	other	 countries,	 seems	
pretty	clear.	The	data	serve	to	explain	why,	during	the	early	1970s,	both	Milton	Friedman	and	
Richard	Nixon	proclaimed	that	‘we	are	all	Keynesian	now’.2	Governments	seem	to	have	learnt	
how	 to	 ‘manage’	 their	 economies.	 Not	 only	 have	 they	 prevented	 a	 repeat	 of	 the	 Great	






capitalists	were	no	 longer	in	the	driver’s	seat.	 If	 they	misbehaved	–	either	by	not	 investing	
















said	 that	unemployment	was	stuck	at	over	20	per	cent	–	as	was	 the	case	during	 the	Great	



















































imperfections,	 stochastic	 variability	 in	 demands	 and	 supplies,	 the	 cost	 of	 gathering	 information	 about	 job	






very	 same	 point	 was	 reiterated	 by	 another	 monetarist	 of	 Nobelistic	 repute,	 Robert	 Lucas:	 ‘When	we	 are	
unemployed’,	he	observed,	‘it	is	because	we	think	we	can	do	better’	(interviewed	by	Snowdon	and	Vane	2005:	













and	 heavy	 subsidization,	 the	 economics	 profession	 has	 remained	 largely	 unfazed,	 but	 the	
policymakers	have	panicked,	in	unison.	Within	a	few	years,	they	have	lost	all	confidence	in	






balance	 in	 the	 OECD	 countries,	 with	 positive	 numbers	 indicating	 a	 surplus	 and	 negative	






Of	 course,	 this	 was	 not	 exactly	 a	 return	 to	 Keynesianism,	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 planning	
through	high	taxes	and	even	higher	spending	(on	the	rise	and	decline	of	'Keynesianism'	in	the	
current	 crisis,	 see	 Farrell	 and	 Quiggin	 2012).	 Instead,	 it	 was	 a	 quick‐and‐dirty,	 ‘hands‐off	
intervention’,	based	mostly	on	tax	cuts	and	automatic	stabilizers.	And	as	we	can	see,	it	was	
hastily	 reversed.	 In	 the	 early	 2010s,	 policymakers	 started	 to	 talk	 about	 ‘austerity’,	 ‘belt	
tightening’	and	‘fiscal	cliffs’.	And	their	U‐Turn	came	not	because	their	economies	were	finally	






















































this	 warning	 was	 happily	 leveraged	 in	 support	 of	 austerity	 measures,	 until	 a	 group	 of	 University	 of	

































































































particularly	 in	 the	European	Union	and	 the	United	States.	This	pattern	changed	drastically	
after	the	crash,	with	the	United	States	 leading	the	way.	Since	2008,	the	U.S.	Fed	has	nearly	








crisis	 of	 2008‐9,	 should	 have	 produced	 deflation,	while,	 from	 a	monetarist	 viewpoint,	 the	










































































































































production,	 and	 this	 relentless	process	 causes	 the	organic	 composition	 to	 rise	over	 time.	
Capitalists	are	also	driven	to	raise	the	rate	of	surplus	value	(although	it	is	not	entirely	clear	
why,	under	competitive	conditions,	 they	should	succeed	 in	doing	so).	 In	Marx’s	opinion	–	
which	he	himself	was	never	completely	convinced	of	–	the	organic	composition	tends	to	rise,	
and	 it	 tends	 to	 rise	 faster	 than	 the	 rate	 of	 surplus	 value,	 assuming	 that	 this	 rate	 trends	
upward	as	well	(on	Marx's	life‐long	attempt	to	grapple	with	this	process,	see	Heinrich	2013;	
for	 contesting	 views,	 see	 Heinrich	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	 progressive	 growth	 of	 the	 organic	
composition	is	offset	by	counter‐tendencies;	but	according	to	Marx,	over	the	longer‐haul	the	
former	 process	 is	 stronger,	 causing	 the	 rate	 of	 profit	 to	 trend	 downward.	 Over	 time,	
                                                            
6	There	is	a	debate	among	Marxists	on	whether	the	proper	definition	of	C	in	these	equations	should	include	(1)	
the	 entire	 stock	 of	 constant	 capital	 being	 advanced,	 or	 (2)	 only	 the	 part	 that	 is	 used	 up	 in	 producing	 the	
commodity.	 In	 our	 presentation,	 we	 bypass	 this	 debate	 by	 defining	 the	 commodity	 to	 comprise	 the	 gross	












of	 measurement.	 Labour	 values,	 which	 Marx’s	 variables	 are	 denominated	 in,	 cannot	 be	
observed	or	examined	directly,	making	their	empirical	inquiry	difficult	if	not	impossible.	The	
second	problem	is	that	mechanization	per	se	can	tell	us	nothing	about	labour	values.	Even	if	



















the	 ratio	 of	 net	 operating	 surplus	 (which	 is	 net	 domestic	 product	 less	 employee	

















Net Operating Surplus /
(Fixed Assets + Labour Income)
(left)















































seems	 to	 trend	downward,	 in	 line	with	Marx’s	 theory.	But	 this	decline	 is	 supposed	 to	be	












must	 first	 differentiate	 between	 productive	 activity	 that	 produces	 surplus	 value	 and	







core	 of	 the	 U.S.	 economy:	 agriculture,	 mining,	 construction	 and	 manufacturing.8	 The	
remaining	 sectors	 are	 considered	 unproductive.	 With	 this	 bifurcation,	 the	 organic	









counter‐tendencies	 that	 more	 than	 offset	 the	 long‐term	 impact	 of	 the	 rising	 organic	
composition.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 theory	 may	 again	 contest	 that	 our	 particular	 choice	 of	
productive	 and	 unproductive	 sectors	 is	 inappropriate,	 and	 maybe	 they	 are	 right.	






















(Productive Assets + Productive Wages)(right)




























NOTE: Productive assets are estimated by the replacement cost of 
net fixed assets in agriculture, construction, mining and 
manufacturing. Productive wages are estimated by compensation of 
employees in agriculture, construction, mining and manufacturing. 
Surplus value is estimated by net domestic product less productive 
wages. The last data points are for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global 
Insight (series codes: FAPNRM11, FAPNRM21, FAPCON and 
FAPM, for net fixed assets in agriculture, mining, construction and 
manufacturing, respectively; COMPDPNRM11, 
COMPDPNRM21, COMPDPCON and COMPDPM for 
compensation of employees in agriculture, mining, construction 

















(share of labour force, right)






































































1980s,	 and	 particularly	 during	 the	 1990s,	 while	 the	 rate	 of	 change	 of	 the	 real	 wage	
accelerated	in	tandem	with	this	fall.	In	light	of	these	developments,	the	crisis	of	the	2000s	
could	 be	 interpreted,	 at	 least	 in	part,	 as	 a	 classical	Marxist	 backlash	 set	 in	motion	 to	 rid	
capitalists	of	excessive	wages	squeezing	their	profit.	And	indeed,	since	the	onset	of	the	crisis,	




But	 the	 connection	 to	 Marx’s	 theory	 here,	 although	 intuitively	 appealing,	 is	 ultimately	
misleading.	For	Marx,	the	significance	of	the	reserve	army	lies	in	its	impact	not	on	the	rate	of	
change	of	the	real	wage,	but	on	its	absolute	level.	Figure	10	examines	this	latter	impact,	and	
the	picture	 it	 depicts	 is	 very	different	 from	 that	of	 Figure	9.	The	 chart	 shows	 the	 rate	of	
unemployment	against	the	right	log	scale	and	the	real	wage	level	against	the	left	log	scale.	





yet,	 from	 then	 onward,	 the	 relationship	 inverted.	 Unemployment	 started	 to	 rise	 and	
continued	 to	 do	 so	 till	 the	 early	 1980s;	 but	 the	 real	 wage,	 instead	 of	 falling	 or	 at	 least	
stagnating,	 rose	 in	 tandem.	Moreover,	when	 unemployment	 stopped	 rising	 and	 even	 fell	
during	the	1990s,	the	real	wage,	instead	of	rising,	stagnated.	From	this	viewpoint,	the	reserve	









































































The	 third	 Marxist	 driver	 of	 crisis	 is	 underconsumption.	 Unlike	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 falling	
tendency	of	the	rate	of	profit,	which	emphasizes	the	limits	on	the	production	of	surplus	value,	




So,	 all	 else	 remaining	 the	 same,	 an	 upward	 redistribution	 of	 income	 from	 workers	 to	
capitalists	will	tend	to	reduce	the	average	share	of	consumption	in	aggregate	spending.	The	
consequence	 of	 this	 reduction,	 say	 the	 underconsumptionists,	 is	 a	 glut	 of	 unsold	








the	 significance	 of	 realization	 for	 capitalist	 crisis	 (Hilferding	 1910;	 Luxemburg	 1913;	































If	 the	share	of	 consumption	 in	personal	 income	 is	associated	negatively	with	 the	 level	of	
personal	 income,	 then	 we	 should	 expect	 personal	 or	 household	 income	 inequality,	
regardless	of	its	source,	to	be	inversely	correlated	with	the	pace	of	economic	activity.		
	
Figure	11	examines	 this	proposition	 for	 the	United	States.	The	dotted	 line	 at	 the	bottom	
shows	the	income	share	of	the	top	1	per	cent	of	the	U.S.	population	(for	a	comparative	critical	
assessment	of	income‐distribution	data,	see	Burkhauser	et	al.	2012).	The	solid	series	at	the	
top	 of	 the	 chart	 depicts	 the	 pace	 of	 economic	 activity,	 approximated	 here	 by	 the	 rate	 of	
growth	of	employment.	Note	that	we	use	employment	growth	rather	than	overall	economic	
growth.	The	reason	is	that,	as	it	is	commonly	measured,	overall	growth	is	affected	by	both	
employment	 and	 productivity	 growth,	 but	 only	 the	 former	 responds	 directly	 to	
underconsumption.	Both	series	are	smoothed	as	10‐year	trailing	averages.	
	
The	 relationship	 shown	 in	 the	 figure	 is	 rather	 remarkable.	We	 can	discern	 three	distinct	
periods,	 indicated	by	the	dashed,	 freely	drawn	line	going	through	the	employment	series.	
The	 first	 period,	 from	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 till	 the	 1930s,	 is	 the	 so‐called	 Gilded	 Age.	
Income	 inequality	 is	 rising	 (at	 least	 during	 the	 period	 for	which	 data	 are	 available)	 and	
employment	growth	is	plummeting.		
	
The	 second	 period,	 from	 the	 Great	 Depression	 till	 the	 early	 1980s,	 is	 marked	 by	 the	
Keynesian	 welfare‐warfare	 state.	 Higher	 taxation	 and	 spending	 make	 distribution	 more	
equal,	while	employment	growth	accelerates.	Note	the	massive	acceleration	of	employment	
growth	during	the	Second	World	War	and	its	subsequent	deceleration	brought	by	postwar	




period,	 monetarism	 assumes	 the	 commanding	 heights,	 inequality	 starts	 to	 soar,	 and	
employment	growth	plummets.	The	current	rate	of	employment	growth	hovers	around	zero	






















































Figure	 11	 certainly	 seems	 consistent	 with	 the	 Monopoly	 Capital	 version	 of	
underconsumption.	 It	 suggests	 that	 the	 current	 crisis	 is	 the	 culmination	 of	 a	 systemic	
increase	in	inequality	that	began	in	the	early	1980s,	which	in	turn	bred	underconsumption	





































Considered	 in	 conjunction	with	 evidence	 shown	 earlier	 in	 the	 paper,	 this	 process	 seems	







In	 this	very	basic	sense,	 then,	Marxists	and	 liberal	economists	sit	on	the	same	side	of	 the	




















































































































whether	 or	 not	 it	 can	 be	 averted.	 Mainstream	 economists	 root	 crises	 in	 imperfections,	
distortions	 and	misguided	 intervention	 that	 can	 be	 solved	 or	 counteracted	 by	 adequate	
policy	 (primarily	 deregulatory),	 whereas	 Marxists	 claim	 that	 crises	 are	 built	 into	 the	












Now,	what	 do	we	mean	 by	 capitalist	 power?	 Following	 the	 explicitly	 scientific	 notion	 of	
power,	 first	 articulated	 by	 Johannes	 Kepler	 in	 1600,	 we	 see	 capitalist	 power	 not	 as	 a	
qualitative	 stand‐alone	 entity,	 but	 as	 a	 quantified	 relationship	 between	 entities.	 In	
capitalism,	 this	 quantitative	 relationship	 is	manifested	 through	 the	 distributional	 grid	 of	

























precise,	 we	 need	 to	 clearly	 delineate	 capital	 income,	 define	 the	 boundaries	 of	 dominant	
capital	 and	 its	 referential	 average,	 and	 set	 the	 relevant	 time	 periods	 for	 computing	 the	
trajectories	of	 the	different	measures.	The	remainder	of	 this	section	presents	a	 tentative,	














of	 the	 series	 is	 up.	 Since	 1929,	 the	 relative	 power	 of	 capitalists,	measured	 here	 by	 their	



























Pretax Profit and Net Interest
as a Share of National Income
(left)
Ratio of Pretax Profit and Net Interest per Firm














































































White	 House,	 monetarism	 back	 in	 the	 driver’s	 seat	 and	 neoliberalism	 in	 full	 swing,	 the	
increase	quickly	resumed	and	lasted	for	another	twenty	years.	(2)	During	the	early	2000s,	






the	 1980s,	 while	 dominant	 capital	 was	 suffering	 differential	 decumulation,	 the	 share	 of	
capital	in	national	income	was	actually	rising.	By	contrast,	in	the	late	2000s,	both	differential	
accumulation	 and	 the	 capitalist	 share	 of	 income	were	 falling.	 Second,	 and	perhaps	much	





it	was	 in	the	1980s.	Pushing	this	magnitude	even	further	–	 let	alone	having	 it	grow	at	 its	
average	 historical	 rate	 of	 4.5%	 –	 will	 require	 an	 avalanche	 of	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions	















the	two	 last	charts	of	 the	paper	–	Figures	15	and	16	(for	 the	earliest	presentation	of	 this	
relationship,	see	Nitzan	and	Bichler	2000;	 for	recent	commentary,	see	Bichler	and	Nitzan	
2014).	The	relationship	presented	in	these	figures	might	seem	counter‐intuitive	–	but	only	if	
you	 take	 your	 cue	 from	 the	 ‘economic’	 understanding	 of	 capitalism.	 If	 you	 look	 at	 these	
relationships	from	the	viewpoint	of	capital	as	power,	the	puzzle	quickly	disappears.		
	










Bichler	 and	Nitzan	 2014).	 The	 capitalist	 share	 of	 domestic	 income	 is	 plotted	 against	 the	













































































































































But	 this	 process	 is	 supposed	 to	 serve	 accumulation	 only	 for	 brief	 periods,	 particularly	
toward	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 business	 cycle.	 Over	 the	 longer	 haul,	 though,	 capitalists,	 just	 like	






accumulation	 of	 capitalized	 power.	 Now,	 understood	 as	 a	 power	 process,	 differential	
accumulation	 requires	 strategic	 sabotage,	and	 this	 sabotage	 can	 take	different	 forms.	We	
have	 explored	 many	 of	 these	 forms	 in	 our	 previous	 works,	 and	 there	 are	 now	 young	
researchers	who	are	extending	this	inquiry	into	new	fields	and	regions.12	But	as	the	charts	












This	 logic,	 though,	 is	 premised	 on	 capital	 being	 a	 ‘real’	 economic	 entity.	 However,	 if	 we	
instead	think	of	capital	as	power,	 there	 is	no	way	 for	policymakers	 to	achieve	both	goals	






include	 Syed	 Ozair	 Ali	 (2011)	 on	 stagflation	 in	 Pakistan,	 Joseph	 Baines	 (2013)	 on	 food	 profit	 and	
malnourishment,	Jordan	Brennan	(2012)	on	dominant	capital	and	income	inequality	in	Canada,	D.T.	Cochrane	
and	Jeff	Monghan	(2013)	on	differential	accumulation	and	struggles	in	South	Africa’s	Apartheid,	Tim	Di	Muzio	
(2012)	 on	 the	 ecological	 limits	 of	 differential	 accumulation,	 Sandy	 Brian	 Hager	 (2013a,	 2013b)	 on	 the	
centralization	of	public	debt	ownership,	Joseph	Francis	(2013)	on	regimes	of	differential	accumulation	in	the	









depicted	 in	Figure	15	 continues	 to	hold,	 the	 share	of	 capitalists	 in	U.S.	 domestic	 income,	
expressed	as	a	five‐year	trailing	average,	is	set	to	rise	further	in	the	coming	years.	The	crisis	
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